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proposer’s payoffs constant across 
the two planks but varied the size 
of the payoffs to the receiver’s 
chamber to investigate if and when 
capuchins were willing to provide 
the receiver’s chamber with a large 
reward (a marshmallow) instead 
of a small reward (a celery piece). 
This led to two kinds of trials: ones 
in which the proposer delivered 
marshmallow to his own chamber 
and chose either marshmallow or 
celery for the receiver’s chamber, 
and ones in which the proposer 
delivered celery to his own chamber 
and chose either marshmallow or 
celery for the receiver’s chamber. We 
then compared monkeys’ likelihood 
of delivering the larger reward in a 
condition in which a receiver monkey 
was present (test condition) to one in 
which no monkey was present (empty 
control condition) and another in 
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Humans demonstrate altruistic 
behaviors in a variety of contexts 
[1,2], but there is growing 
experimental evidence that our 
closest living primate relative, the 
chimpanzee, does not always share 
our human prosocial tendencies 
[3,4]. Although chimpanzees behave 
cooperatively in some contexts, 
there is growing evidence that 
chimpanzees are indifferent to 
others’ needs when food is involved. 
Indeed, a number of studies have 
shown that chimpanzees fail to 
selectively donate food to others 
even when they do so at no cost 
to themselves [3,4]. Chimpanzees’ 
lack of other-regarding preferences 
in these recent studies had initially 
caused many researchers to 
conclude that humans are alone in 
our capacity for prosocial giving. 
Researchers have therefore begun 
exploring why humans’ prosociality 
differs from that of closely-related 
primates, leading some to observe 
that humans’ prosocial tendencies 
might stem specifically from their 
history as reproductively cooperative 
breeders (see [5,6] for evidence of 
prosocial giving in cooperatively 
breeding primates). Here, we test 
this claim directly, providing a 
surprising demonstration that one 
non-cooperative breeder,  the tufted 
capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), 
reliably exhibits prosocial behavior in 
a food-sharing task modeled after a 
human economic task known as the 
Dictator Game [2]. 
Capuchins (n = 7) could pull one 
of two wooden planks that could 
deliver food to two side-by-side 
chambers (Figure 1). Food placed 
on the left side of the planks could 
be accessed only in the chamber 
where the subject was positioned 
(the proposer’s chamber), while 
food placed on the right side could 
be accessed only from the second 
chamber (the receiver’s chamber). 
Only the subject monkey in the 
proposer’s chamber could pull and 
operate the planks. We kept the 
which no monkey was present and 
an opening allowed the subject to 
access rewards in the receiver’s 
chamber (selfish control condition). 
In contrast to work in chimpanzees 
[3,4] and the predictions of a 
cooperative-breeding account [5], we 
observe reliable prosocial behavior 
in capuchins. Subjects were more 
likely than chance to deliver the 
better marshmallow reward to the 
receiver’s chamber when a receiver 
was present, as shown through a 
two-tailed one sample t-test (t(6) = 
3.47, p < 0.01) (Figure 2). Monkeys 
also delivered larger rewards on 
the selfish control (t(6) = 5.55, p < 
0.001), but not on the empty control 
condition (t(6) = 1.73, p = 0.13). 
Further examining this pattern, we 
confirmed using one-tailed t-tests 
that monkeys donated the larger 
marshmallow reward reliably more 
Figure 1. The experimental set-up in the test condition. 
The apparatus consisted of two wooden shelves each containing a plank baited with food. Only 
the monkey playing the role of the proposer (in this case, the monkey on the left) had access to 
ropes which could move either plank toward the enclosures. In this way, the proposer (but not the 
receiver) could select which plank would deliver food. The two planks always provided the same 
reward to the proposer’s side (in this case, marshmallow), but differed in the rewards provided 
to the receiver (here, the top plank delivers celery, and the bottom plank delivers marshmallow). 
This set-up could be modified so that the recipient monkey was not present (the empty control 
condition), and additionally modified so that the proposer monkey could reach into the receiver’s 
chamber, thus allowing the proposer monkey to collect any food rewards delivered to this chamber 
(the selfish control condition).
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R1000underlie the emergence of altruism in 
humans.
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Figure 2. Proportion of large reward (marshmallow) deliveries across all three conditions. 
The proportion of trials in which proposers chose to provide a receiver with marshmallow 
rather than celery is plotted on the y-axis, and condition type is plotted on the x-axis. Sub-
jects delivered the marshmallow more than chance on the selfish control condition (t(6) = 5.55, 
p < 0.001) and the test condition (t(6) = 3.47, p < 0.01), but not on the empty control condition 
(t(6) = 1.73, p = 0.13). often when a receiver monkey was 
present than when he was absent 
(Mean Difference: 8.1%, t(6) = 1.91,  
p = 0.05). Monkeys donated the  
larger reward slightly but not 
significantly less often when a 
receiver monkey was present than  
in the selfish control condition in 
which the proposer monkey could 
receive the larger reward himself 
(Mean Difference: 12.6%, t(6) = 1.77,  
p = 0.06). 
The monkeys’ performance on the 
control conditions demonstrated that 
they understood the nature of the 
pulling task, showing significantly 
more deliveries of the larger reward 
in the selfish control condition than 
in the empty control condition (Mean 
Difference: 20.6% marshmallow pulls, 
t(6) = 4.99, p = 0.001). Importantly, 
however, the proposer’s personal 
payoff — receiving marshmallow 
versus celery — had no effect on 
subjects’ prosocial tendencies 
(F(2,12)= 1.56, p = 0.25). That is, 
monkeys significantly donated the 
marshmallow reward to their partner 
even in conditions in which they 
themselves received the celery 
reward. This result suggests that 
capuchins continue to demonstrate 
prosocial tendencies even in cases in which the receiver’s payoff is larger 
than the one the proposer is allowed 
to keep for himself. This is especially 
striking given capuchins’ known 
tendency to evaluate their rewards 
in relative terms [7–9], and to reject 
rewards that are relatively smaller 
than those of another monkey [7]. 
Indeed, humans exhibit diminished 
regard for others in situations in 
which actors receive rewards that 
are relatively smaller than those 
given to receivers (for example [10]), 
contrasting with the rates of giving 
we observed in capuchins. 
Our results show that capuchins 
reliably give food to other individuals 
in a limited-form Dictator Game, 
providing the first evidence that a 
non-cooperatively-breeding species 
shares human prosocial tendencies. 
In fact, capuchins’ prosociality 
persists even in the most stringent 
case in which a proposer’s prosocial 
choice results in the receipt of a 
relatively smaller personal reward. 
These results raise the possibility 
that prosociality may be broadly 
shared throughout the primate order 
despite its conspicuous absence 
in chimpanzees [3,4], and thus 
demonstrate that ecological factors 
other than cooperative breeding References
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